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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article will argue that efficient breach of World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) 
obligations should be facilitated through a remedy of monetary damages and that in 
circumstances of complete trade cessation following breach the best method for 
calculating these damages is the reliance measure, meaning the aggregate of private 
investment undertaken in the injured state in anticipation of liberalized trade with the 
offending nation.  Monetary compensation is itself a preferred remedy because the 
elimination of concessions and or retaliation is often damaging to the injured state.  
Setting damages via the expectation measure, which is traditionally associated as 
accommodative of efficient breach, is inappropriate because the level of injury resulting 
from WTO violations is too speculative, whereas for some types of breach reliance can 
be assessed with a reasonable degree of certainty and therein fulfills the goal of 
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predictability in the Dispute Settlement Body (‘DSB’)1 which should in turn encourage 
future efficient breaches.  Compensation fixed at the level of reliance can also more 
directly compensate the actual victims of WTO breaches, the private exporters, and as 
such it better fulfills a purpose of welfare maximization through the optimal allocation of 
resources as well as achieves the normative goal of fairness.  Much as the application of 
remedies drawn from American contract law to the arena of international trade is 
predicated primarily upon the commonly acknowledged conceptual similarities between 
contract and WTO agreements, many of the contract-based concepts, including reliance, 
also have parallels in international law.  A comparative law study of remedies drawn 
from the contract laws of other legal systems, such as those of civil law countries, may be 
similarly instructive but is beyond the scope of this article.  SET OUT STRUCTURE 
which begins with a brief outline of the current remedial regime at the WTO.   
 
II. WTO REMEDIES AND THE NEED FOR MONETARY DAMAGES 
The remedies available for violation of the covered agreements of the WTO are 
prospective which in a practical sense means that instead of punishing offending 
Member’s for wrongs they have committed in the past, the remedies seek to prevent 
future injury to the complaining Member.  Two principle remedies are available:  
compensation, which is defined as the removing of trade barriers2, not the payment of 
money damages as is common in domestic private law; and so-called retaliation, which 
can be authorized if the parties cannot agree on satisfactory compensation within twenty 
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2
 Dispute Settlement Understanding Art 22.1 
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days3.  Retaliation, which has no parallel in American common law, consists of the 
suspension of concessions or other obligations which essentially means the establishment 
of trade barriers against goods originating from the respondent Member state4.  
Retaliatory measures must be equivalent to the loss that the offending Member’s measure 
has caused the injured Member to suffer5, and should also relate to the same sector of the 
economy6.  Arbitration is available if the offending Member objects to the proposed level 
or sector of retaliation7.  The DSB will grant authorization to retaliate on the basis of the 
arbitrator’s report via the reverse consensus rule that is seen in the adoption of panel and 
Appellate Body reports8. 
There has been significant academic debate recently regarding whether the WTO 
dispute settlement system accommodates, or should accommodate, economically efficient 
breaches through some form of compensation (also described as a liability rule), or 
whether it mandates compliance with obligations to the extent possible (a property rule).  
Jackson and Pauwelyn have argued against the acceptability of efficient breach within the 
WTO, urging that a strict obligation to comply with DSB dispute settlement 
recommendations can be inferred from the DSU.9 Schwartz and Sykes have drawn upon 
                                                
3
 DSU Art 22.2.  The term “retaliation” is not used in the text of the DSU but is now widely employed by 
commentators. 
4
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5
 DSU Art 22.4.  Loss is described as “nullification or impairment”. The Agreement on Subsidies and 
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6
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7
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8
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9
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to “Buy Out”? 98 AJIL 109 and also JACKSON SOVEREIGNTY BOOK at 147 (the WTO does not even 
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the WTO:  Rules are Rules, 94 AJIL 335 (2000); see also Yuku Fukunaga, Securing Compliance Through 
the WTO Dispute Settlement System:  Implementation of DSB Recommendations, 9 JIEL 383 at 397 
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indeterminacy in the text of the DSU to support the accommodation of efficient breach 
within WTO remedies10, a view that has gained additional support recently from Green 
and Trebilcock.11  Trachtman has also written favorably of the goal of efficient breach, 
observing that although WTO law should be seen as mandatory, states that violate WTO 
law are not subject to enforceable specific performance-type remedies, nor do they 
experience any formal penalty for their violation.12  Sebastian doubts that WTO dispute 
settlement can accommodate efficient breach as it is impossible to properly calibrate the 
level and target of retaliatory measures.13   
This article adopts the position that it is at least arguable that the WTO DSU 
contemplates remedies other than strict compliance (or specific performance to use the 
terminology from contract law) and that efficient breaches can and should be encouraged 
within the WTO framework as opposed to compliance with obligations at any costs.  As 
Schwartz and Sykes have shown, the DSU is generally permissive and where possible 
this flexibility should accommodate remedial options which maximize the welfare of 
trading partners, especially in light of the language in the preamble to the WTO which is 
to promote the optimal use of resources through trade.14 Since the focus of this article is 
the measure of financial compensation that foster efficient breach, it is necessarily 
                                                
10
 Warren Schwartz and Allen O Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution 
in the World Trade Organization, 31 (1) JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 179 (who take a public choice 
view that the political cost of compliance may be greater than the economic cost of breach).  For example, 
Sykes and Schwartz refer to the reasonable period of time to bring measures into conformity with 
obligations under Art 21(3) (at 188) and that the fact compliance is only “preferred”, Art 22(1) (at 190). 
11
 Andrew Green and Michael Trebilcock, Enforcing WTO Obligations:  What Can We Learn From Export 
Subsidies, 10 JIEL 653 (who feel that a liability rule is preferable in the case of subsidies because of high 
transaction costs) .   
12
 Joel P Trachtman, The WTO Cathedral at 146. 
13
 Thomas Sebastian, World Trade Organization Remedies and the Assessment of Proportionality:  
Equivalence and Appropriateness, 48 Harvard International LJ 337at 375 
14
 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, first paragraph.  Although this 
statement specifically refers to the objective of sustainable development and the protection of the 
environment, the diction is strongly indicative of an underlying efficiency objective. 
 5 
premised upon the approach, adopted by several scholars such as Bronckers and Van den 
Broek15 that monetary damages are a suitable remedy for violations of WTO obligations, 
both from an efficiency (lower risk of improper compensation) and fairness (real victims 
compensated) perspective.  While it is beyond the scope of this article to address fully the 
merits of monetary compensation as opposed to retaliation, some comment on this 
controversial alternative remedial regime is warranted.   
Briefly, monetary compensation may be preferable because strict compliance with 
WTO obligations may be politically impossible because it may interfere with the 
offending state’s sovereignty in a way that monetary compensation does not, much as 
specific performance has been viewed as a threat to individual liberty.16  Existing 
remedies involving countermeasures, as they typically involve trade restrictions against 
goods from the losing party, are hostile to trade liberalization and usually end up 
economically injuring the retaliating nation. Restrictions often harm businesses and 
individuals in the losing nation that seek to export to the winning complainant.17 
Countermeasures from a weaker nation may also prove ineffective when a powerful 
nation has failed to comply with its obligations.  Worse, retaliation by a small nation 
                                                
15
 Marco Bronckers and Martin van den Broek, Financial Compensation in the WTO:  Improving the 
Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement 8 JIEL 101.  See also Susan Bermann, EC Hormones and the Case 
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in International Trade Law, 65 U of Pittsburgh LR 763; Andrew T Guzman, The Loss of Credibility:  
Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution 31 J of Legal Studies 303 at 322 (advocating money 
damages at the WTO to facilitate efficient breach), Kym Anderson, “Peculiarities of Retaliation in Dispute 
Settlement” 1 World Trade Review 202 at 133.; Pauwelyn “Rules are Rules” at 346 (advocating retroactive 
monetary compensation); Joel P Trachtman, The WTO Cathedral, 43 Stanford J of International Law 127; 
Bernard O’Connor and Margareta Djordjevic, Practical Aspects of Monetary Compensation: The US 
Copyright Case 8 JIEL 127 (arguing that monetary compensation must be extended on an MFN basis). 
16
 Paying compensation is less intrusive than changing laws:   A Schwartz, The Case for Specific 
Performance, 89 YALE LJ 271 at 296-297. 
17
 See eg JOHN JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge U Press, New York, 2006) at 198.  See also eg  J Pauwelyn, 
Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO – Rules are Rules, 94 AJIL 335 at 343. Cf Mark Movesian, 
Enforcement of WTO Rules: An Interest Group Analysis, 32 Hofstra L R 1 at 4 (arguing that retaliation can 
rally lobbyists in the target country which will result in compliance even if there are short term costs 
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against a stronger one could lead to counter-retaliation in non trade-oriented fields such 
as development aid.18   
The use of monetary damages within the WTO has been derided because of this 
remedy’s inability to induce compliance compared to trade sanctions.  Sanctions can also 
be targeted at a specific exporter in the offending state and they provide temporary 
benefits to domestic firms that are forced to compete with the specific imports.  
Moreover, monetary penalties may be particularly onerous for developing nations who 
have limited access to hard currency.  Finally there is legitimate concern that enforcement 
of a monetary compensation payment could necessitate resort to retaliatory sanctions 
anyway should compliance not ensue.19  Some of these issues will be addressed in the 
final section. 
 One of the chief criticisms of existing remedies at the WTO, and also indirectly of 
the application of efficient breach to the WTO arena, is the near impossibility of 
calibrating the level or target of retaliation or equivalent concessions in any meaningful 
way, a legitimate challenge that is readily applicable to a scheme of monetary 
compensation.20  A second central objection to monetary compensation and its facilitation 
of efficient violations is that compensation through the WTO is not properly channeled to 
those parties that are truly affected, and consequently any calculation of overall welfare 
maximization is misguided.21  Before we explore how the reliance measure offers a 
                                                
18
 J Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO – Rules are Rules 94 AJIL 335 at 338. This 
argument could also be made against monetary damages, see below SECTION ???? 
19
 See generally Sykes 34 J of Legal Studies at 654-661; SOMEBODY ELSE – TRACHTMAN?  
20
 See eg Trachtman at 34-38, Kym Anderson, Sebastian, Holger Spamann “The Myth of Reblancing 
Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement Practice” 9 JIEL 31; J Jackson, International Law Status of WTO 
Dispute Settlement Reports:  Obligation to Comply or Option to “Buy Out”? 98 AJIL 109 at 121-122 
21
 Eg John Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports:  Obligation to Comply 
or Option to “Buy Out”? 98 AJIL 109 at 119, John Linarelli, The Role of Dispute Settlement in World 
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solution to these problems for some types of breaches it is necessary to explain precisely 
what is meant by efficient breach. 
 
III. EFFICIENT BREACH 
The American tradition of economic analysis of the law posits that legal rules should, and 
often are, chosen such that they maximize the welfare of both the parties and of society 
itself by ensuring that resources are held by those who value them the most.22 In the law 
of contract efficiency dictates that the promisor should perform when his costs are less 
than the promisee’s benefits, just as efficiency requires the promisor to breach when the 
opposite is the case.  The higher the cost of liability for breach, the stronger the 
commitment will be to perform the contractual promise.  When the liability is set at the 
efficient level, the promisor will perform if so doing is more efficient than breaching, and 
breach if breaching is more efficient than performing.23  The cost of performance will 
exceed the benefits when an event occurs that makes the resources needed for 
performance more valuable in an alternative use.24  Laws, such as those of contract or of 
world trade, should be designed to promote breaches that result in this optimal allocation 
of resources among trading parties because this is preferable to compliance where 
wasteful.  The selection of a legal process that has a high degree of precision and 
predictability in its encouragement of the socially desirable activity of efficient breach is 
                                                                                                                                            
Trade Law:  Some Lessons from the Kodak-Fuji Dispute, 31 L and Policy of International Business 263 fn 
331.  TRACHTMAN 156-157. 
22
 COOTER ULEN AT 180 
23
 COOTER ULEN AT 190. 
24
 Such events are often grouped into two categories:  unfortunate contingencies (which raise the cost of 
performing beyond the price to be paid by the other party) and fortunate contingencies (wherein an 
alternative use is discovered that is more profitable.  COOTER ULEN 238-245 
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therefore another important component of efficiency25.COSTS CERTAIN ETC.  THIS IS 
ACHIEVED BY RELIANCE REMEDY FOR CERTAIN TYPES OF BREACH AS 
OPPOSED TO THE INDETERMINATE EXPECTATION MEASURE. 
 The adaptability of the objective of fostering efficient breach to WTO remedies 
rests upon the often-drawn, and perhaps artificial, comparison between WTO trade 
concessions and the law of contract.  In one sense rules of American contract law can 
readily inform those rules through which the WTO operates because membership in the 
WTO is itself achieved via the contractual (treaty-based) consent of states to be bound to 
the rules of that system.26  The relationship between WTO members has been further 
analogized to contract in that disputes arise when the bilaterally negotiated trade relations 
between two nations are upset, not because multilateral rules for the benefit of all 
members are violated.27 Membership in the WTO has even been equated with contract by 
the Appellate Body itself.28   
This comparison is apt to a degree, but as we shall see in Section V, not 
axiomatic. The primary flaw in the analogy is that the primary beneficiaries of WTO 
obligations are not the state governments who enter into the negotiations but rather their 
constituents, specifically their domestic producers and consumers.  It follows that the 
failure of efficient breach to account for injuries suffered by non-governmental parties 
outside the bi-lateral “contract” (or so-called externalities) remains one of the principal 
                                                
25
 Isaac Ehrlich and Richard Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking” 3 J of Legal Studies 
257   DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RULES AND STANDARD.. 
26
 Warren Schwartz and Allen O Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution 
in the World Trade Organization, 31 (1) JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 179 at 180.  
27
 J Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules  94 AJIL 335 at 340.  
Pauwelyn notes that WTO countermeasures are akin to non performance of a contractual obligation 
because of breach by the promisor. 
28
 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS/8,10,11/AB/R (adopted 1 November 
1996) at 15. 
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criticisms against the application of efficient breach, and indeed the contract metaphor 
itself, to the WTO dispute settlement process.29 However, the law of contract contains 
provisions that specifically address the rights of third (extra-contractual) parties. Given 
that the congruence of WTO violations and the breach of contractual promises arguably 
support the transposition of contract-based monetary remedies to a WTO setting we will 
now examine the chief measures of damages employed by contract law for breach as 
commentators have applied to WTO violations30. 
 
IV.  THE EXPECTATION MEASURE 
The expectation measure is the standard contract law remedy that is available as of right 
for breach of contract under common law systems and it is the remedy most commonly 
associated with the concept of efficient breach.   Expectation aims to compensate the 
injured party by awarding a monetary amount that places the party injured by the breach 
in the position it would have been if the other party had performed their obligation as 
promised.  By gauging monetary compensation according to the ideal standard of actual 
performance, perfect expectation damages are said to leave the victim indifferent between 
performance and breach.31  This measure fits well with efficient breach because the 
promisor can break his contractual promise where he can earn more elsewhere, and 
simply compensate the promisee through the payment of damages that equate with what 
they expected their profit through performance would have been. 
                                                
29
 Eg John Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports:  Obligation to Comply 
or Option to “Buy Out”? 98 AJIL 109 at 119, John Linarelli, The Role of Dispute Settlement in World 
Trade Law:  Some Lessons from the Kodak-Fuji Dispute, 31 L and Policy of International Business  263 fn 
331 
30
 This article will not examine the restitutionary measure or liquidated damages, both of which are also 
employed in American contract law and neither of which are supportive of efficient breach because 
damages under these measures will or may equal profits gained from breach. 
31
 See generally COOTER at 226. 
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  One of the principle flaws with the concept of efficient breach are the transaction 
costs associated with bringing claims in court, negotiating settlement and most 
importantly the costs of assessing damages at trial.32 Likewise, litigation costs associated 
with monetary compensation payments have been identified as a serious weakness of 
monetary penalties applied to the WTO,33 especially in relation to Developing Countries 
(‘DC’s).  A more troublesome form of transaction costs are those associated with the 
failure to set properly the quantum of compensation at trial.  These “error costs” are an 
equally problematic feature of damages assessment by WTO arbitrators and one that 
frustrates an attempt to encourage efficient breach.  Inconsistent methodology for 
calibration of injury is directly counter to the DSB’s stated objectives of security and 
predictability34 and is exacerbated by the reality that trade volumes are not necessarily 
commensurate with terms of trade to begin with.35  
It can be seen from the existing literature that the prevailing unease associated the 
unpredictability of future injuries is actually an injunction against the presumed 
implementation of the expectation measure, not the concept of monetary compensation 
itself.   Setting appropriate limits on the extent of harm suffered emerges as a particularly 
problematic feature of arbitrators’ decisions, especially given that a goal of wealth 
                                                
32
 MURRAY PAR 117.C.  These have been cited as economic justification for the specific performance 
remedy:  A Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance 89 YALE LJ 271 (1979) at 291-292.  The DSB 
continuously monitors the implementation of countermeasures, which results in another overall welfare 
reduction to the system (DSU Art 22.1?) 
33
 Sykes Public Versus Private Enforcement at 660 cf Trachtman 182-183 who argues that WTO litigation 
will be proportionately cheaper than private litigation given the large amounts at stake. 
34
 DSB Art 3.2 
35
 Trachtman Cathedral at 153.  Green and Trebilcock also note particularly that there is no necessary 
connection between the level of a subsidy and the harm caused to other members, as very threat of a 
subsidy can be enough to cause harm in other states: at 675. 
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maximization necessitates precise quantification.36 The uncertainty of damages assessed 
via lost profits in general international law has similarly been criticized by 
commentators37 and this is no less true at the WTO.  Sebastian has recently provided an 
excellent critique of the confusing rationale employed by WTO arbitrators in their 
attempt to quantify appropriate retaliation levels according to volumes of future trade 
foregone.  Arbitrators tend to favor the “equality of harm” method (attempting to set 
retaliation levels at the same level of harm suffered in terms of amount of trade blocked) 
which is inherently arbitrary because of the need to establish a “counterfactual” i.e. 
speculate what the situation would be if the barrier were removed.  Anderson has noted 
that trade loss equivalence will not equal damage to economic welfare, except 
coincidentally, (which seems to implicitly acknowledge third party effects) and has 
questioned the legitimacy of a complainant’s proposed “counterfactual” scenario as 
inherently self-serving.38 Spamann has similarly attacked arbitrators’ frequently 
unsubstantiated formulation for setting retaliation levels based upon trade effects or 
economic gains / losses resulting from an illegal barrier, leading him to the conclusion 
that “the difficulties of arriving at a consistent counterfactual are insurmountable”.39  
Bernstein and Skully object to the mechanical methodology of WTO arbitrators in 
calibrating appropriate compensation, noting the numerous and often unreliable methods 
in which a credible counterfactual can be established to conclude that the DSB should 
spend less time on “developing complex methodologies or economic models” in favor of 
                                                
36
 Thomas Sebastian, “World Trade Organization Remedies and the Assessment of Proportionality:  
Equivalence and Appropriateness” 48 Harvard International LJ 337. 
37
 Eg, John Gotanda, “Recovering Lost Profits in International Disputes” 36 Georgetown J of International 
L 61    
38
 Kym Anderson, at 129-130. 
39
 Holger Spamann 9JIEL at 59 47-48, (problems with calculation based in large part on the flawed 
conflation of profits with exports, or turnover, variables that are not necessarily identical). 
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“a more simple [sic], straightforward approach.”40  Trachtman’s somewhat turgid 
solution to the problem of quantification includes an assessment of anticipated 
retrospective and prospective net welfare costs to producers and consumers in the injured 
state, adjustments for future uncertainty, opportunity and enforcement costs, as well as a 
concession that specific performance may be preferable when uncertainties herein are too 
great.41  
The defects associated with setting compensation levels are the consequence of 
the inherent indeterminacy of the expectation measure, predicated as it is upon comparing 
the situation after breach to a hypothetical situation that would have existed had the 
breach not occurred.  Setting monetary damages would be marginally easier if there was 
an established pattern of trade between the victim and offending Member states, however 
if the traded commodity or the trade relationship was new or relatively new such that 
totals from previous periods would be speculative then the approximation of the 
expectation measure would be even less reliable.42  A similar objection could be made of 
seasonal exports; it would be unjust to point to sales figures, for example following the 
end of a growing season to accommodate losses suffered from foregone trade in off-peak 
season consequent to a trade barrier.   
                                                
40
 Jason Bernstein and David Skully, “Calculating Trade Damages in the Context of the World Trade 
Organization’s Dispute Settlement Process” 25 Review of Agricultural Economics 385 at 397. 
41
 Trachtman cathedral.  An appropriate counterfactual should include figures for a hypothetical stream of 
income based upon net present expected cash flow, future expected cash flows discounted according to a 
risk-adjusted opportunity cost and risks of future uncertainty assessed according to the full range of 
alternative scenarios, at 160 and 144. 
42
 Although it has since been largely discredited as unfair, the “new business rule” of American 
jurisprudence encapsulated this problem of estimating future profits for un-established businesses Eg 
Century Coal & Coke Co. v Hartman, 111 F. 96 (8th Cir. 1901).  US courts will typically allow lost profit 
assessment if it can be proven with reasonable certainty: J Gotanda, “Recovering Lost Profits in 
International Disputes” 36 Georgetown J of International L 61 at 71-72.   
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While many scholars have observed the unfairness engendered by improperly 
calibrated, counterfactual oriented remedies which do not accurately reflect real injuries 
from trade barriers, they have failed to identify the importance of the associated “chilling 
effect”43 on Member state’s future conduct.  Without a precise, predictable formula for 
determining the extent of liability, how can Members make informed decisions about 
whether or not breach will be profitable?  This uncertainty would be tolerable, and indeed 
welcome, if the purpose of the remedy was compliance with trade obligations – an 
unknown (and unknowable) sanction might discourage the prohibited behavior.  But as 
the goal of a remedial system should be to support breaches that are efficient, the 
inconclusiveness of an expectation-based monetary remedy is clearly counterproductive. 
 
V. THE RELIANCE MEASURE 
In assessing the potential for efficient breach at the WTO, scholars appear to have 
entirely disregarded reliance, a measure of damages which compensates the victims of 
breach for any investments they have undertaken in anticipation that performance will 
occur.  These so-called “out of pocket expenses” are known in the civil law tradition, and 
often also in international law, as damnum emergens, representing actual loss suffered, 
not future income that was foregone (lucrum cessans, as the expectation measure is 
typically identified).44  As a fall-back measure when expectation is impossible to 
calculate, common law courts award reliance damages to place the injured party in the 
                                                
43
 POSNER ARTICLE 1974 
44
 Damnum emergens is slightly different from the common law concept of reliance as damnum emergens 
normally includes opportunities foregone, which reliance normally does not: L Fuller & W Purdue, “The 
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages” 46 Yale LJ 52 at 55-56. The terms “wasted costs” or “sunk costs” 
are also used to describe the reliance costs. 
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position that they would have been in had they never entered the contract with the other 
party.   
 Since damages tied to investment expenditures will rarely exceed gains from 
breach, the reliance measure supports the doctrine of efficient breach and should 
accordingly be implemented by the WTO DSB on grounds of welfare maximization.45  
Unlike the expectation measure, for breaches that cause complete trade cessation the 
reliance presents the least difficulty with respect to the error costs and chilling effect of 
faulty approximation in compensation payments at the WTO and thus achieves 
predictability, which in turn will guide member States whether or not to risk breach in the 
future by minimizing their fear of excessive damages.  The reliance measure also 
addresses the second principle argument against efficient breach in the WTO; that 
contract-type remedies do not acknowledge that the primary victims of WTO violations 
are actually private exporters, and as such it acknowledges the true welfare gains and 
losses from breach.  We will now evaluate precisely the extent to which reliance is able 
to achieve these goals.   
 
i) Quantification 
The reliance measure offers much more concrete benchmark with which to quantify 
injuries than the expectation measure because it obviates the need for recourse to a 
complex hypothetical situation of liberalized trade.  However the suitability of the 
reliance measure is limited to WTO violations that result in a complete cessation of trade 
with the offending member, such as would result from an outright prohibition of imports 
                                                
45
 An exporter will only export when his costs of production are less than his gains from trade, at least in 
the long term. 
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based on a discriminatory, prohibited ground, for example a measure ruled illegal under 
the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT) or the Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Agreement (SPS) or even a tariff of such magnitude that trade was completely 
forestalled.  Reliance based damages would not be advantageous where some level of 
trade continues at a reduced rate with the offending member or where the resulting profit 
to the exporting nation is merely diminished because of some tariff or other measure such 
as a subsidy because the ensuing injury would require the determination of a 
counterfactual (full trade versus reduced trade), as per the flawed expectation measure.   
Reliance-based calculation in circumstances of an injury of zero trade would operate as 
follows: Each individual manufacturer of the affected good within the complainant 
exporting state would present to the WTO arbitrator statements outlining their total 
investments incurred in anticipation of producing, manufacturing and shipping the good 
to the offending state.  Such expenditures would include wages of laborers involved in 
the growing or assembling the good, equipment and tools, land leasing and maintenance 
fees as well as transportation and fuel.46   
These reliance-based costs could be proven via documentary evidence in the form 
of invoices which would be tendered by the injured Member state to the arbitrator.  If 
evidence of pre-trade expenditures was unavailable, as might be the case for 
unsophisticated exporters operating in DCs47, this material could be obtained by the 
complainant state at the direction of, and perhaps with the assistance of the DSB, under 
                                                
46
 The total amount of such “out of pocket” expenses borne following the specific trade commitment could 
then be reduced by the amount of investment that had been expended in order to supply the relevant 
commodity to all other states that had not imposed a trade barrier.   
47
 However, many of the exporters in DCs are owned by powerful multinational corporations, as in the 
BANANAS CASE CITE.  Such companies should possess advanced accounting standards and records. 
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their existing powers of information seeking.48  This type of exercise is precisely what is 
conducted by the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(‘ICSID’) when it assesses damages based on “amount of investment” as an alternative to 
the overly-speculative lost profits.49 The segregation of joint-costs could be difficult, such 
as those incurred by producing workers and their employers.  Problems may also result 
from the treatment of capital expenditures – a large expense may be incurred at the 
beginning of an export activity resulting in a distorted picture of loss for that year.  
Investment-related expenses would be more difficult to establish in an industry with 
numerous small exporters and for this reason the proposed reliance measure of damages 
would be best suited for oligopolies, such as the aircraft or automobile manufacturing 
industries, as opposed to, for example, agriculture or textiles, although these often 
apparently diverse markets may actually be controlled by one or two powerful 
multinationals50.  Exporters in highly concentrated industries may also prefer to reveal 
the costs of their investments rather than their anticipated profits which could be 
commercially sensitive if disclosed to a competitor.51 
Once a numerical value for the aggregate trade related costs was obtained, this 
sum would be payable by the offending state for every year (or every period depending 
on how the total was arrived upon) that the trade barrier remained in place52.  The 
                                                
48
 Article 13 DSU.  It may be necessary to resort to oral evidence if no documentary proof was available. 
49
 eg PSEG Global Inc. (Claimant), Konya Ilgin Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret Limited 
Sirketi (Claimant) v Turkey (Respondent) ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5 Award.  Determining losses in the 
investment context, which may include such one-time large expenses as consulting or legal fees, would be 
substantially less complicated than costs incurred by numerous, potentially disorganized individual 
producers across a nation in the case of trade.   
50
 EG BANANAS DISPUTE CITE EARLIER POINT AND FUJI KODAK DISPUTE 
51
 This is seen as an advantage of reliance remedies: RICHARD EPSTEIN, TORTS, (Aspen Publishers, New 
York, NY, 1999) at § 21.3. 
52
 Some Member states may wish to set aside funds in advance for the payment of WTO claims, much as 
the US government has established the Judgment Fund to facilitate the payment of claims to US citizens by 
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requirement of ongoing payment fits the proposal of the African Group made during 
Doha negotiations that monetary compensation should be paid continually until the 
withdrawal of the unlawful measure53 a view which appears to be more concerned with 
ensuring ultimate compliance with obligations rather than fostering the efficient 
allocation of resources, which is the purpose of permitting monetary compensation as 
opposed to enforcing strict compliance from the outset54.  Although a regular transfer of 
money may seem wasteful in that suppliers in the injured state would obviously cease 
expending resources on trade-related activities because of the illegal measure, and 
consequently monetary compensation would represent a windfall in later periods 
(investment losses would cease), we would expect that overall wealth maximization 
would still be achieved because the profits derived from the imposition of the trade 
barrier in the offending nation would exceed these payments, or else the barrier would be 
lifted.  Removal of the prohibited measure would voluntarily occur once it became more 
profitable. 
 Over-compensation must be avoided as it is inefficient to grant damages to the 
injured state that result from over-reliance: spending more than was reasonable in 
anticipation of future trade gains.55  This would also discourage future breaches that 
would otherwise have been efficient.  A limitation on compensation payments is achieved 
                                                                                                                                            
the Federal Government, authorized under  31 U.S.C. 1304(a)3 <http://fms.treas.gov/judgement> (1 April 
2008) 
53
 Doha Development Agenda negotiations, African Group TN/DS/W/15 9 Sept 2002 at 3.  The temporary 
nature of the payment may render it more acceptable from a viewpoint of compliance with the general 
principles of the multilateral trading system, including the possible violation of the MFN standard: see 
O’Connor and Djordjevc Practical Aspects of Monetary Compensation8 JIEL 127 at 14, referring 
particularly to United States- Section 110(5) Copyright Act WT/DS160/R (panel report adopted 15 June 
2000), the only WTO dispute in which monetary damages have been awarded to date.  
54
 This latter goal may be fully facilitated through an incremental decrease in monetary compensation over 
time, as noted below.   
55
 COOTER ULEN at 246-247 
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via the contract law doctrine of foreseeability, which dictates that over-reliance on 
contractual performance is not compensable,56 and are also well-established in public 
international law.  Although not mentioned explicitly in the text of the Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility, the commentary notes that “the notion of a sufficient causal link 
which is not too remote is embodied in the general requirement …that the injury should 
be a consequence of the wrongful act.”57 A similar prohibition against recovery for 
“indirect damage” is seen in international arbitration, although the test is also phrased as 
one of “normality”: the defendant state is held responsible for the normal consequences 
of its unlawful act.58  Problems associated with determining which injuries are too remote 
for conventional (non-monetary) compensation at the WTO have been identified by 
scholars59 however this should be a minor concern in the context of a reliance-based 
remedy because we can infer that an exporting company will not spend more than the 
minimum necessary to achieve their expected level of trade because to do so would be 
contrary to good business judgment.  Any level of pre-trade investment should be viewed 
as one undertaken in the legitimate belief that a commensurate level of trade would 
occur, unless proven otherwise.  The risk of opportunism (spending more in the hope that 
a trade agreement would be violated) is similarly unlikely.60  
                                                
56
 A promisee who may incur losses that are unforeseeable to the promisor at the time of contracting must 
notify the promisor in advance in order to recover damages fully.  The leading case on this principle is the 
English case Hadley v Baxendale 156 Eng. Rep 145 [1854].  This is now embodied in Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts par 351(1). 
57
 DRAFT ARTICLES COMMENTARY TO ART 31 REPARATION. 
58
 See CHRISTINE GRAY at 22-23.  The normality test was used in the Nautilaa cases:  1930 
Portugal/Germany 2 RIAA 1013 at 1032. 
59
 Patricio Grane, Remedies Under WTO Law, 4 JIEL 755 at 758 and 771 and Thomas Sebastian 
HARVARD ARTICLE at 355 (referring to a limitation on retaliation imposed by arbitrators in EC 
Bananas) 
60
 The only practical relevance of remoteness limitations in damage assessments would be in the equally 
unlikely event a Member state were to inform a trading partner in advance of the implementation of an 
illegal measure that one would be imposed in the near future.  As such any reliance incurred by the non-
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Any monetary damages recoverable for expenditures in preparation for 
contractual performance must also be reduced to the extent that they could have been 
avoided by the injured Member state or its injured exporters, as per the contract principle 
of mitigation61 which is also known to international law.  The Draft Articles of State 
Responsibility specify that willful acts of the injured state, or its citizens, shall be taken 
into account when assessing the reparation owed by the violating party.62 It is well 
established in international jurisprudence that the plaintiff should not act unreasonably in 
a way that increases the extent of his loss63 and that reasonable expenses incurred in the 
act of mitigation will be reimbursed by the offending Member.64  To the extent that 
resources that would have been expended on lost trade with the offending member could 
be re-directed to augment trade elsewhere, or perhaps even for domestic consumption, 
such opportunity gains could operate as a reduction in the damages award.  In keeping 
with an efficiency objective as opposed to one of compliance, the associated reduction in 
compensation payment would be equal to the cost of those successfully re-channeled 
investments, not the profit that they ultimately yielded, thereby encouraging wealth 
maximizing alternative uses by the injured party.  
Under the common law reliance damages are not normally available for breach of 
contract if there would have been a net loss in the performance and the burden is on the 
breaching party to demonstrate with reasonable certainty that there would have been a 
                                                                                                                                            
violating state thereafter, including during WTO dispute settlement, would be unreasonable and 
unrecoverable. 
61
 Murray at par 122.A. 
62
 Art 39 Contribution to the Injury. 
63
 Christine Gray at 24. 
64
 General Electric Company v The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-US C.T.R. vol 26 p 
148 at pp 165-169. 
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loss in order to disqualify the application of the reliance measure.65 This rule should be 
inapplicable to the context of monetary damages at the WTO because there may be an 
unavoidable, anticipated financial loss during the initial years of a trading relationship as 
a new exporter establishes a presence in the foreign market.  Similarly, levels of reliance 
might be higher initially because of “start up” costs incurred “in the attempt to crack the 
respondent market.”66  The reliance measure emerges as the most suitable measure to 
gauge monetary compensation in such circumstances.  Assessing injury based on the 
volume of trade foregone might result in under-compensation at the early stage of a trade 
relationship where the market for foreign goods may be lower at the same time that actual 
costs sustained in commencing production and supply of a good will be high.  However, 
because of the risk of over-compensation due to high start up costs, it may in some 
circumstances be necessary to decrease the annual compensation payment incrementally 
in recognition of both 1) declining investment costs67, and 2) the desire that the exporting 
nation to seek alternative markets, re-direct their workforce and reduce their eventually 
inefficient “dependency” upon the payments.  This reflects a balancing of the goals of 
efficiency and compliance.  Because the injured Member should be able to adapt to the 
conditions arising from breach it should therefore become less onerous over time for the 
offending Member to maintain ongoing violations than to engage in new, more harmful 
ones.  Of course, some flexibility should be maintained with respect to the application of 
the reliance measure in order to tailor the remedy to suit the particular trade relationship 
between the party states and the affected good(s) or service(s).   
                                                
65
 MURRAY par 119 
66
 Charles M Gastle, The Convergence of International Trade and Competition Law Through a WTO 
Market Access Code, 8 Currents: International Trade Law Journal 3 at 19.   
67




ii)  Third Party Beneficiaries 
Reliance is the preferable measure of compensatory damages because it recognizes harms 
suffered by private economic actors as a result of WTO violations by addressing each 
investment cost undertaken by individuals or firms, rather than at a largely fictitious state 
level.  Trachtman has identified the crucial distinction in economic preferences between 
the injured state itself and those of its constituents, which can yield a sharp difference in 
the assessment of whether a breach has actually been efficient, in that it has produced a 
desired end, or not.68 The fixing of payment according to the costs borne by private 
parties accordingly brings the compensation calculation closer to the goal of 
compensating the real “national economic welfare consequences of the import barriers” 69  
than the value of the total imports curtailed.   
Pauwelyn’s assertion that the winning state might simply allocate a damages 
award as it sees fit70 is an over-simplification of in reality what could be both an 
inefficient and unfair process.  Without pre-designated, verified expenses tabulated for 
identifiable beneficiaries, there is no reason to expect that the private parties will actually 
receive compensation commensurate with their economic damage and error costs herein 
could be massive.  As monetary damages will be assessed according to the aggregate of 
each private party’s out of pocket losses, distribution of the monetary award from the 
winning Member state directly to its injured constituents will be facilitated by the 
presence of each injured exporter’s submitted cost evidence.  Under a carefully outlined 
                                                
68
 Trachtman at 152. 
69
 Kym Anderson at 133. 
70
 Pauwelyn, “Rules are Rules”  fn 64 “following the rules of diplomatic protection…unless specific rules 
are framed, it is up to the receiving government to decide how compensation is to be redistributed”. 
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reliance award based upon cost submissions from all parties concerned, the distribution 
of monetary compensation will predictably reflect injuries that were actually suffered, 
rather than according to some amorphous concept of state welfare.  While the verification 
and distribution of individual claims could be difficult for some Members, the process 
could be conducted via an on-line claims system.71 The increasing penetration of internet 
in the developing world72 should ensure that injured exporters will be able to 
communicate the extent of their financial injuries to their respective governments without 
difficulty.  The settling of individual claims could be further improved were the WTO to 
assist in the process, perhaps as trustee of the monetary award in order to oversee that the 
funds were allocated according to proven individual costs.73  While the transaction costs 
of distribution could be considerable in any event, we should expect that they will be 
lower than those resulting from a mis-allocation of funds based upon a flawed 
counterfactual based upon state welfare that ignored individual injuries.74   
This practical advantage is tied to the reliance measure’s evidentiary function as 
seen in contract law’s principle of vesting for third party benefits.  Economic actors, such 
as the corporations and consumers in each member state have been accurately described 
                                                
71Much as the aforementioned Judgment Fund operates in the US SUPRA NOTE X. 
72
 Penetration rates of the internet in Africa, Asia, Central and South America is increasing, although the 
growth rate is slow.  Rohan Kariyawasam, International Economic Law and the Digital Divide:  A New Silk 
Road? (Edward Elgar, MA,USA, 2007) at 28, quoting an unspecified study by the OECD. 
73
 This is seen in the US where a contractual promisor may pay the judgment owed into the court and 
permit the court to determine who should receive it:  Murray par 133.  This concept is predicated on the 
principle that satisfaction of a promisor’s duty to a third party beneficiary will satisfy the promisor’s duty to 
the promisee (Restatement 2d par 305). 
74
 Third party interests are reflected in the Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP) which grants the 
right to bring complaints by suppliers in the domestic courts (or tribunals) or the offending member state.  
It is significant that a reliance-type measure is expressly acknowledged as a potential means of assessing a 
remedy here. Article 7 c) of the AGP provides that the domestic challenge procedures should achieve: 
“correction of the breach of the Agreement or compensation for the loss or damages suffered, which may 
be limited to costs for tender preparation or protest.”  
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by Charnovitz as beneficiaries of the WTO contract.75  Under American contract law, 
intended beneficiaries of contracts are capable of suing promisees or promisors for 
compensation as a result of breach, regardless of whether there was any prior obligation 
owed by the promisee or promisor to the beneficiary.76  To obtain such a right of action, 
beneficiaries need not be specifically named in the contract, it is sufficient if they are 
members of an identifiable class or group of persons.77  However, in order for the third 
party beneficiary to be able to sue under the contract their rights must have “vested” and 
this typically necessitates that the third party act in reliance upon the promise made by 
the promisor to the promisee, the justification being that a beneficiary that is unaware of 
the contract has no expectation.78 American contract law has viewed assent to the 
contract by the beneficiary as a sufficient indicator of reliance79 however this signal is 
inapplicable in the context of the WTO as a beneficiary’s assent is not notionally 
equivalent to the political support in favor of trade liberalization in the form of collective 
lobbying because on an individual or firm level there may not actually have been any 
awareness of the contractual obligation undertaken for one’s benefit.  Normatively then, 
an exporter within the injured Member state should not be entitled to monetary 
compensation from the breaching state as a result of a broken trade concession if is 
unaware that the breaching state had entered into liberalized trade in the first place as a 
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 S Charnovitz, Economic and Social Actors in the World Trade Organization, 7 ISLA J OF 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE L 259 at 268 
76
 JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS (4th ed) (Lexis Nexis, Newark, NJ, 2001) 
par 129, Restatement of Contracts 2d par 304 (1981). The public has been viewed as contractual 
beneficiaries in contracts undertaken by their governments, Murray par 132, Restatement 2d par 313.  IN 
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 Restatement 2d par 308. 
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 MURRAY ON CONTRACTS at par 131.2 
79
 Restatement 2d Contract para 311 
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condition of WTO membership (the equivalent of a contractual promise).  Essentially the 
rule that third party contract rights are contingent upon reliance guards against 
unsubstantiated third party claims, or put another way, it prevents opportunism by 
potential exporters alleging a damaged trade expectation without having undertaken any 
legitimate activity directed at exploiting a favorable trade concession.  In this way, 
establishing entitlement to financial relief according to actual investment expenses is a 
way of screening illegitimate claims by third parties suppliers for a portion of the 
monetary compensation received by their governments through the WTO dispute 
settlement system.80  This again underlies the important characteristic of evidentiary 
clarity that reliance-based compensation demonstrates. 
 
VI. WTO VIOLATIONS AS TORT 
Posner and Sykes have suggested that reliance is an inappropriate measure of damages 
for compensation in international law on the basis that it, or something resembling it, is 
not referred to explicitly in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility.81 However, as 
noted above damages based on “actual investment” are frequently awarded in 
international investment arbitration when future profit levels are highly speculative82.  
                                                
80
 This rule could be particularly important in the case of developing countries that might not have the 
resources to sustain the transaction costs involved in verifying the authenticity of all compensatory claims 
from their citizens. 
81
 Eric A Posner and Alan O Sykes, An Economic Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility Under 
International Law, 9 American L & Economics R 72 at 115. But the Draft Articles clearly outline that 
compensation may cover any “financially assessable damage”81 a category into which out of pocket 
expenses in anticipation of performance could easily fall. 
82
 See e.g. Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award (Dec. 8, 
2000); PSEG Global Inc. (Claimant), Konya Ilgin Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret Limited 
Sirketi (Claimant) v Turkey (Respondent) ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, 2007, 19 January 2007.  Note that 
the recovery of “actual investment” costs in such cases is often predicated upon the provision for such 
awards in the investment contract itself. 
 25 
Awards of reliance-based damages for tortious actions by states are also commonplace 
and it is to this type of claim that we will now turn.   
Although neither the panels or Appellate Body has ever characterized them so, 
WTO agreement violations conceptually fall within the sphere of tort, specifically the tort 
of interference with prospective contractual relations83; the offending member state’s 
prevention of foreign exporters from acquiring or continuing their trade relations.  The 
tort of interference with prospective contractual relations is well established in 
international law, provided, as in American law, that the interference with contractual 
relations was intentional.84 Clearly the passage of an unlawful trade barrier by a WTO 
Member is intentional and indeed they are often specifically designed to hinder the ability 
of foreign exporters to trade within its territory.85  The offending Member inflicts injury 
upon foreign exporters for example by causing domestic purchasers to sever trade 
relations with foreign suppliers as a result of the additional cost of a WTO prohibited 
tariff, or because of the better opportunity resulting from a prohibited subsidy.  This tort 
fits well with the international trade paradigm because it does not require that an export-
import contract for goods or services be in place in order for liability to be found, and this 
may often be the case in international commercial transactions.  This tort also 
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 Restatement Torts 2d par 766B: “One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's 
prospective contractual relation … is subject to liability … whether the interference consists of 
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue the prospective relation or (b) 
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(1975) 14 Cal 3d 815.  
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 Leigh Anenson, Defining State Responsibility Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Measures ‘Relating To’ 
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 The requisite intent is likely augmented by the fact that the measure would be illegal under the WTO:  
see Anenson id, at 708-713 discussing the application of intentional interference in the NAFTA context. 
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contemplates situations where market entrants anticipate commencing export activities in 
reliance on the trade liberalization ensured by virtue of their state’s membership in the 
WTO.  Reliance based damages are specifically envisioned as a suitable remedy for this 
tort:  where the plaintiff is prevented from tendering the performance of future 
contractual dealings with a third party because of the defendant’s interference, the 
plaintiff may recover for expenses to which he is put in preparation of his performance.86  
The ability of private third parties to recover ascertainable investment costs for 
this type of tortious interference with their exporting activities indirectly through the 
WTO is crucial given that not only are private claims directly against Members states 
forbidden at WTO, but some member countries have enacted statutes that specifically 
prohibit their courts from hearing claims against foreign sovereign states for damages 
resulting from interference with contract.87   By channeling monetary damages through 
the winning Member state to their injured citizens through WTO dispute settlement 
remedies, such tort-like compensation for WTO violations addresses a significant gap in 
the law of international trade. This is not to suggest that private economic actors should 
be able to bring suit against states for the passing of any legislation that impairs their 
ability to conduct commercial activities, indeed almost any government action could 
warrant private litigation if that were the case. Rather the impugned government measure 
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 As calculating damages based on lost profits from a future transaction would be fraught with uncertainty, 
the typical situation in which reliance is used rather than expectation: Restatement 2d Torts par 774A 
Comment b, c. Recovery will be limited by the requirement of intention to those results which were 
foreseeable.   
87
 eg the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. par 1605(a)(5)b.  Thus an American company 
whose export contract with a foreign purchaser was harmed by a foreign state’s WTO violation cannot sue 
that foreign state in a US court for interference with contractual relations. 
 27 
must be wrongful in some way, such as violative of an international treaty like the WTO 
agreements.88  
Remedies associated with the tort of interference with contractual relations have 
been criticized for undermining the economic benefits brought about by efficient 
breach.89 If a contracting party can be persuaded to breach a less lucrative contract in 
favor of a better one and still afford to compensate the injured party with whom it had 
originally promised to deal, then tort law should not nullify that which contract law has 
encouraged by imposing an extra layer of liability upon the violator.  Granting the 
plaintiff an additional cause of action in tort against the inducing party would seemingly 
allow inefficient over-recovery.   However this concern is inapplicable in the WTO 
context because there is no recourse for the injured supplier against the offending 
Member state or against a third party importer i.e. against the party with which it was 
intending to form trading relations with, as there may not be any contract in existence 
upon which a conventional suit in contract could be founded, or if there is it may have 
been rendered inoperative by the imposition of a trade barrier.90  There will therefore be 
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only one level of compensation, not two as feared, and consequently efficient breach 
remains feasible91.  As Remington has observed, the tort of interference with contractual 
relations is more commonly applied by courts when there is no other adequate remedy 
available to the plaintiff, for example when the original contracting party is insolvent.92 
In that context, reliance damages against the inducing party are the most sensible remedy.   
The characterization of WTO violations as torts deserving of reliance-type 
remedies rather than as contract breaches may be further legitimized when one re-
conceptualizes, perhaps counter-intuitively and certainly controversially, that trade 
barriers should be viewed as the status quo and trade liberalization as an artificial 
construction induced through decades of negotiation, much as a contract does not exist 
until there has been offer and acceptance.  As reliance places the injured party in the 
position it would have been had no contract taken place, the awarding of costs incurred 
according to the degree which states (or more precisely, their commercial citizens) relied 
on these barrier-reducing commitments is  merely the restoring the parties to their 
“natural” pre-WTO, or pre-GATT positions.  In this way trade barriers, or mercantilism 
as it was generally practiced before the post-war Bretton Woods regime, and to an extent 
even before the Enlightenment, should not be viewed as a wrongfully injurious but rather 
as simply a pre-contractual state of affairs93.  Accordingly, a remedy should be sought 
that aims to restore the injured party to its pre-contractual position, or whatever trade 
arrangement it was in prior to negotiated concessions. 
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93
 The obvious problem with this analogy is that the WTO’s remedies are prospective only – they are not 








Perhaps the strongest claim against efficient breach with monetary damages within the 
WTO, irrespective of the measure of those damages, is that there is no way to ensure that 
a monetary award could be enforced without some kind of retaliatory sanction, resort to 
which then renders monetary damages meaningless.94 While international reputation is 
often considered a strong source of enforcement of international obligations, it is not 
immediately clear that this is a credible solution, particularly in light of the fact that 
efficient breach with cash payment is itself contingent upon disobedience to assumed 
responsibility and is therefore morally unjust from a reputational standpoint even if 
consonant with the rule of law.  The risk of non-compliance with awards of monetary 
compensation as illustrated herein may be exacerbated by the acknowledged lack of 
explicit language in the DSU that supports such a regime.95 Indeed contracting parties 
that are worried that the dispute settlement system is already more onerous than they had 
originally envisioned may well be revolted by remedies of such precision imposed by 
arbitrators. 
 However since defiance of international obligation is often viewed as a response 
to a perceived attack on sovereignty, we might expect that the application of familiar 
legal concepts may placate a violating state’s distaste for imposed monetary sanctions.  
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that they will be enforced Trachtman cathedral at 161 
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 JACKSON Sovereignty at 145, buy out article too 
 30 
Recourse to common law contract law principles, such as the reliance measure of 
damages is prudent because we may expect that the WTO’s two most frequent and most 
economically powerful users, the United States and the European Union, will be less 
likely to resist monetary awards that may be imposed against them should such awards 
employ remedies that mirror those of their domestic legal systems96.  It is also very 
important to acknowledge that arbitration decisions under Article 22.6 of the DSU are not 
binding on future arbitrators therefore there should be less consternation among the 
Members that such a “radical” approach as a reliance-based monetary damages award 
will have a precedential effect, the future threat of which could undermine a willingness 
to comply. 
Related to the issue of enforcement is the effect of monetary awards based on 
reliance will have on DCs, because an onerous judgment against a poor nation might 
result in non payment by that Member.  However, we should expect that a DC in breach 
of its WTO obligations will not be disproportionately burdened by a monetary award 
imposed against them because their portion of the export market will compose a 
correspondingly small segment of even a large, developed nation’s trade-related reliance 
expenses.  Damages will therefore be bearably modest.  Furthermore, the concern that a 
monetary payment in favor of a DC could result in equivalent reductions in development 
aid,97 is unlikely given that the domestic political cost of diminished foreign aid should 
operate as a deterrent against such “offsetting.” Even were these assertions untrue, then 
provision for special and differential treatment for DCs98 could operate, as could the 
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abuse of right doctrine seen in international investment law – which prevents monetary 
damages against developing countries that would impoverish the liable state party99.  
Either could be invoked by WTO arbitrators to curtail the quantum of monetary 
compensation where necessary. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
To the extent that WTO obligations can be viewed as contracts between trading partners, 
it may be appropriate to consider WTO remedies through the lens of the common law of 
contracts because this regime offers an insightful solution to the problem of inflexibility 
in the DSU’s remedial regime.  Difficulties with calculating compensation and retaliation 
for WTO breaches mirror criticisms that have been levied against the doctrine of efficient 
breach – it is difficult to assess lost trade under the expectation measure in order to 
calibrate a remedy that will be welfare maximizing for all parties concerned, including 
importantly private parties, which are often neglected under efficiency analysis.   
The reliance measure of damages represents the most quantifiable method of 
ascertaining the proper level of monetary damages for those WTO violations that result in 
a complete cessation of trade and by implementing it to set an appropriate monetary 
remedy, trade barriers may be imposed to the extent that they garner overall profits that 
exceed losses while avoiding the often self-defeating and ineffectual retaliation.  
Reliance’s function as a means of establishing third party contractual rights justifies its 
imposition as a normative remedy that addresses injuries suffered by economic actors 
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whose interests are not adequately protected in the WTO forum.  The reliance measure is 
appropriate also because of the similarities between WTO violations and the tort of 
interference with prospective contractual relations.   
In order to promote future breaches of WTO commitments where economically 
efficient for all parties this article has proposed a remedy consisting of a periodic 
payment corresponding to the out of pocket expenses incurred by exporters in the injured 
state for trade purposes during the period before breach occurred.  Although a remedy of 
this precision is not explicitly contemplated by the text of the DSU it is in keeping with 
the dispute settlement system’s stated goal of predictability and supportive of the WTO’s 
overall purpose of resource optimization. 
 
 
